

CRISIS NOTES

Miscalculations, Surprises, Deceptions

Why is gov forced to contemplate violent/radical action on urgent basis? ~~For~~ General aim to avoid such desperate, risky situations; why wasn't this averted? Search process recapitulated earlier, etc.?

2) Failure to foresee need, problem, challenge, event.

3) Failure to respond to forewarnings, to search, invent, plan, analyze, evaluate actions; or to take prevention actions, or innovate. (so problem is more severe, desperate, than it "had" to be — even though it might have been foreseen. Inertia; inhibitions to preparation; lack of attention at high level.

(Postcrisis crises) Loss; CA, ME, FE coups;

4) Failure to foresee, or foresee import, of critical details — of "style," execution, timing, declarations, context, etc. symbolic significance, feasibility (e.g. in context, or in time).

CRISIS NOTES 64

Cuba: What we learned about running a fait accompli should teach us what to expect from an ally or enemy.

e.g. 1) failure to tell, consult Allies.

2) failure to tell CINCS

2) Don't count on indicators from the CINCS

b) CINCS would have been unready for enemy response

c) CINCS would not have coordinated with Allies, host countries.

d) CINCS would not have warned of problems, obstacles; advised.

e) CINCS "planning" would have to be done for them.

Analyze: Pattern of surprise in Cuba

(Is surprise as shameful as fear?)

Who was surprised? Evidence?

How much?

By what? Why?

When?

Effects?

e.g. effect on immediate objectives of a surprisingly grave, imminent threat: ambitious objectives in area abandoned for defensive; status quo ante objectives.

Low involvement in Cuba; military units; two mms;

"Secret knowing" — Oct 15-22

from covert recon

(Chris. Felix)

But limited ability to use, because of need for
secrecy. Can't reveal by actions;

or by leaks; hence, can't inform internally

(verbal; or by subordinate actions; or
from external observation through
"perholes")

(But internal leaks will occur. Effects?)

"Don't tell anyone." But some will be told.

Effects?

Pattern and Effects of: Lack of Confidence

Who in Who?

Why?

Evidence? How expressed?

Covering What?

(C * C. Centralized control; monitoring; feedback;

veto; bypassing; not informing;

specificity of directions

separate channels of monitoring

Not revealing goals.

Fear of staff support; not reporting up;

delaying info; selecting info;

Desire for longer forces than military ask!

Political desire, not only for Discrimination
and Central Control

but: Shorter Reaction Time

Adequately large (organized) Forces

McV distaste for bombers.

Air invasion plans.

(Political demands create an internal crisis in
the implementing and planning agencies.)

(Because unexpected!) e.g. Taiwan Straits

Why the Pres/McV emphasis on "short reaction time
from a no-alert status"?
no-warning

JCS recommendation Oct. 27 ; did it affect

Pres political environment, hence decision?

Increases costs to Pres of the failure of an "inaction" policy.
or, a different

(How about JCS/CINCPAC recommendation in Taiwan Strait?)

Fear of leak?

Advantages of demonstrating compliance

highly coordinated, smooth action
showing internal efficiency

Secrecy

We didn't pass on to our Allies info
on low moves

on our plans

highly important to their security; possible low
responses, Berlin, etc.

relevant to their alert, readiness, plans.

(We might have alerted US forces — not NATO)

Alerting moves — e.g. to components in Europe
from Services — threatened to reveal problem
to Allies.

Problem of SACEUR/CINCEUR responsibilities

for alerting

for passing info

for advising: Pres, NAC

Surprises during crisis.

- 1) SC tactic: turning back interesting ships,
continuing with others (not anticipated
in planning)

hence, decisions...

- 2) Ambiguous SC signals: continuing with other
messages
some
continuing with ships
turning back others

Linkage of Crises

Crisis (Boy of Pigs) → Contingency Plans preparation →
Future crisis; orientation, etc.